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NOTES

THE POSTWAR NATURAL
REVIVAL AND

LAW

ITS OUTCOME

For the past two years or so the discussion of natural law has been losing
greatly in momentum. After World War II the number of books and essays in
periodicals, particularly in Germany and Austria, concerned with this discussion
was immense. At present not a few opponents to any natural law idea, positivists,
think the hour is at hand for striking back. It seems, therefore, opportune to
review the various lines of development in this discussion. To do so by referring to the many authors taking part in it and the details of their arguments
would fill a large volume. The present writer hopes to deal with the whole discussion in the not too distant future in connection with his Social Ethics. Only
a few general lines on which the discussion developed and which point to fields
of further investigation for the natural law student, may here be briefly reviewed.
It would be a grave mistake to assume that the traditional natural law doctrine emerged without any need to re-examine its positions and, in consequence,
to restate its fundamentals. For undoubtedly some progress of the human mind
in coming to grips with the problems involved must have ensued from such a
long and exacting discussion. Incidentally, St. Thomas (I-II, q. 97, art. 1 and 2)
is very definite in his suggestion that, in general, progress of such a kind is "natural" to the human mind. Of course, when traditional natural law doctrine is
mentioned in this essay, it is the doctrine rooted in Plato, Aristotle, Augustine,
Thomas, Suarez, Vitoria.
Let us, however, first follow up the lines of thinking which have developed
outside traditional natural law doctrine, either in concurrence with some essential features of it or in radical disagreement. The main points of view to be
mentioned are the ethical, psychological, ontological, historical, sociological, theological.
A very large proportion of juristic thinking, which is prepared to accept natural law in principle, tends to restrict it to the ethical sphere. All law, according
to this theory, rests ultimately on a moral basis; moral principles, including those
linked with religious beliefs, are in no way to be separated from law; yet natural
law and its principles of justice belong only to the realm of morality (the ethicizing of natural law) and not to that of law (ius) itself. With the traditional natural
law doctrine, however, the ethical side of natural law and the metaphysical side
which is linked with man's essential nature, are inseparably connected: the law
of nature is to be understood as moral reason, but not to be restricted to its
moral and jural principles. It consists of an order of conduct determined ontologically by human nature as a whole and thus not only by subjective insight
but equally by objective fact.
On the other hand, there are attempts to derive from the ontological order
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in human nature a kind of system of norms (the ontologizing of natural law).
The argument moves from exactly the opposite point of view to that of the rationalist natural law theory which sought to derive a normative system from pure
reason. In contradistinction to one-sided ontological arguing, the jurist is no
doubt right when he thinks of natural law first and foremost in terms of norms
of law, or general principles of law, and when he asks about their kind and
source, as well as about the nature and form of their authority. He wants to
know about the formation of law (lawgiver) as well as its administration (judge).
Indeed, he is then largely in line with those exponents of traditional natural law
theory who proceeded from the self-evident general principles or norms of the
human conscience (synderesis as the 0 core of lex naturalis) and referred to the
suum cuique as the supreme principle in natural law (ius naturale).

Other thinkers, in reconsidering the natural law idea, look for points of support in the philosophy of value. Directly evident values, principles of value, ideals
of value are used to establish standards for judging the existing law and goals
for the further development of existing law. As a matter of fact, so far as general value principles are in question, they are akin to, if not identical with, the
self-evident, intuitively grasped moral and legal principles of which traditional
natural law theory speaks. But when value philosophy and value ethics exclude
reason from the comprehension of values and of the order of values and ascribe
it to feeling (the psychologizing of natural law), no link can be seen between
value (bonum, justurn) and being (esse). What, then, is the objective criterion
for determining which values are the true values - values either in terms of a
general value theory or in the light of a particular social or historical reality?
No wonder that some authors come to the conclusion that the values found in
the value pattern of natural law doctrine are only those valid in Western society.
On the other hand, it seems understandable that juristic thinking is today
focused especially on the historical legal reality. In the light of our present historical knowledge of the varieties of legal systems and legal customs jurists view
with reserve the notion of invariable legal norms. And not a few try to establish
theories according to which all law represents merely a product of evolution (the
historicizing of natural law). For some jurists the underlying idea of an evolutionary process includes the assumption that human reason is in itself only a
product of evolution of the animal mind.
Others attempt to understand the natural law idea merely as an expression
of social forces, and at the same time as an ideological motive factor in the evolution of social systems (the sociologizing of natural law). Supporters of this purely sociological interpretation of natural law are confronted with the question of
the basic assumption from which to reconcile its two contradictory hypotheses:
first, that the idea of natural justice is supposed to be an invention of ruling
groups to support the legal order favorable to their interests; second, that it is
supposed to be an invention of oppressed groups in society in the process of their
efforts to secure a social order in accordance with their own interests.
The reducing of all law to historical and sociological elements could not but
result in the endeavor to explain law exclusively in terms of power or expediency and to eliminate the idea of the suprahuman lawgiver (the secularizing of
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natural law). All secularized natural law theory finds itself fraught with the
difficulty of explaining the moral-jural conscience. For it is today commonly
held among jurists that positive law is not as a rule obeyed out of fear of punishment but that the mainspring of obedience is man's conscience. No ethical
skepticism has as yet succeeded in showing that the moral conscience with its
knowledge of original human rights, rooted in man's moral responsibilities, is
merely a self-deception of the human mind.
The jurist who shares the Christian outlook will unreservedly recognize the
divine lawgiver as the ultimate source and sanctioning power of natural law.
On the other hand, the approach to natural law is made more difficult to those
who are remote from Christian belief if patural law is interpreted in terms of
revealed truth (the theologizing of natural law) instead of natural reason, especially as the jurist is accustomed to seeing reason at work in an exemplary fashion
in the great legal system which to a great extent has undeniably helped to form
our legal systems and legal thinking up to the present day, namely, the Roman.
There is certainly no real objection to a "theology" of natural law which lays
open a rich fund of problems of an anthropological, metaphysical, epistemological, and methodological character. But it seems indisputable that less today than
ever before the "philosophical" investigation into, and establishing of, natural law
should be questioned as the central task of natural law theory. It is certainly not
by chance that Thomas Aquinas, having the best of the Middle Ages with him, in
spite of the prevailing uniform Christian outlook, treated natural law theory
philosophically, and that he does so in his Summa Theologiae.
During the years of new approaches to its subject matter, traditional natural
law doctrine, to be sure, has been able to hold its own, at least as far as its fundamental positions are in question. At the same time it cannot be denied that,
as a result of points raised in the course of these efforts, it is now faced with
a widespread array of problems.
First of all, there is the anthropological question. Of course, the anthropology
centering on the idea of the "animal rationale" still stands. But the schools of
biological, evolutionary, historical, sociological, psychological, ethnological anthropology have broken so much new ground that natural law doctrine will have to
show in much greater detail how its metaphysical anthropology fits in with indisputable empirical facts. Comparatively, the medieval natural law school had
knowledge only of a very narrow range of empirical facts. Since then we have
learned that mankind has existed at least half a million years, that the very highly
developed ancient civilizations never approached scientifically the problem of
natural law, that innumerable peoples and tribes are guided by codes of law or
rules of custom which, prima facie, seem very difficult to fit into the medieval
natural law doctrine. (One such highly developed civilization with a very old
tradition faced me with this problem when I had to write a foreword to the
Japanese edition of Social Ethics.) The student of natural law with the presentday knowledge of facts will feel it is inconsistent simply to say "the barbarians do
not use rational laws" (I-II, q. 97, art. 1) when the fundamental principles of
the good and the right are thought to belong to the lumen naturale and this to
man as animal rationale.
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This and a number of other problems raised by the discussion in question
seem to call for a further probing into the epistemological problem of knowledge
with regard to natural law principles. The task will be twofold. It concerns the
individual's knowledge and scientific knowledge. With regard to the first: How
far does the general maxim apply, omnis cognitio incipit a sensibus, and how far
will it have to be used in ascertaining the concrete contents of the self-evident
principles? With regard to the second: What is the logical nature of these principles- are they purely analytical in character? Both these questions are the
more urgent today as analytical philosophy and linguistic analysis try to show
that those principles are either empty tautologies, propositions without any concrete contents, or value judgments about which any discussions in terms of scientific language is impossible.
Closely connected with the problem of knowledge is the problem of the actuality of natural law, now not considered as a rule of reason but as a factor in the
legal and social systems, notwithstanding the grave aberrations to be found in
them. Some schools of Protestant social ethics have an easy solution: there is
post lapsum no such thing as an order of society recognizable as preordained in
human nature and, in consequence, no reality of natural law in operation; we
are, this school insists, exclusively dependent on theological anthropology and
on theological ethics, which in turn are dependent solely on revelation; hence, the
conclusion runs, the reality of natural law is no real problem at all.
There is the further problem, how far, if at all, natural law can be made
inoperative in positive law. It is of significance in view of the present-day totalitarian states with populations of 200 to 600 millions, the latter number referring to
China with its civilization going back beyond the first millennium B.C. It is particularly important, however, to realize that natural law in operation will have to
be studied with a view to the long-standing antagonism between the natural law
school and the positive law school in Western societies, in order to turn it into a
mutually fruitful discussion in the search for truth. Such endeavors seem further
necessary in order to meet the schools of legal thinking which try to establish the
idea of a multitude and variety of patterns of original natural law which are
operative, they suggest, in the national systems of law or customs.
Only one more problem may be mentioned, that of demonstratingnatural law.
Three ways seem to be open. First, the empirical-historical way. It was attempted by Viktor von Cathrein in his three volumes (1910), The Unity of Moral
Consciousness in Mankind. Since then an enormous amount of fresh material
has been collected in ethnology and empirical anthropology, but the effort of
Cathrein has as yet found no continuation. The second way is metaphysicaltheological. Of course, natural theology is meant. It will have to be much more
elaborate than it appears to be in the textbooks. If one thinks of the prolonged
exposition of lex naturalisand ius naturalein Suarez, and of the various endeavors
of St. Augustine to demonstrate philosophically the lex aeterna, which is today
simply referred to as a standing idea, then there seems no doubt that a good deal
will have to be done by the traditional natural law doctrine to catch up with the
endeavors of those two great exponents, as well as to deal with the implications
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of the two ideas of lex naturalis and ius naturale, in the perspectives in which
they present themselves to the modern mind.
Particularly the concept of "natural law" (lex naturalis) has for modern

science a very definite meaning, one that was altogether alien to medieval thinking. In medieval thinking the idea of natural law was restricted to the moral
world. The modem concept refers, roughly speaking, to forces immanent in the
nature of beings and operative in a constant manner. This, then, could be called
the third way of demonstrating natural law. St. Thomas would have been the
first to inquire into the necessity of adapting the traditional natural law idea to
the modem concept. Indeed, there are features in his exposition of lex naturalis
which seem to invite such adaptation. This would, I think, mean laying more
emphasis on the forces and impulses in human nature, urging to the attainment
of fully human existence and operating first of all through the family. Man
is in the first place neither a political (related to the state) nor an individual being
but a family being. For man the family is by far the most important, indeed
absolutely indispensable group, if he is to grow into true human existence. Thus
the present-day problems apparently point to a central idea of natural law doctrine, though one of a more modern origin (Leo XIII), namely, to the idea that
the family is the cell of society, biologically, psychologically, morally, economically,
culturally, and not less ontologically and metaphysically. The concept of man
as ready-made animal rationalemay well prove to be too much of a simplification.
Too often he lives as such in the textbooks fundamentally as an individual, who also
has social obligations; whereas man is by nature, i.e., ontologically and metaphysically, as much a social being as he is an individual being. Even the lumen naturale, and especially moral insight, are not inborn, but are dispositions of nature
to be developed by nurture into the faculties by which the animal rationale can
do what he is ordained to do.
The postwar natural law discussion has been focused on the fundamental
natural law principles, their logical and epistemological character, their psychological and historical origin, their ontological and metaphysical foundation, their
political and social validity, and all this in very general terms. Thus it has been
occupied with problems which St. Thomas thought should not be so much in
vogue, since the fundamentals of natural law, namely, its general principles, were,
he thought, established and were familiar to the human mind. He was thinking
in a period of development of the human mind when he was fully entitled to
such assumptions. In a secularized world the situation is different. On the other
hand, what he thought to be the chief task will still have to be the main pursuit
of the traditional natural law'doctrine: the application of the natural law principles to the changing world in the political, social, economic, cultural field. The
fact that the postwar interest in the fundamentals or in mere generalities is abating
indicates, it seems, that Thomas was right in thinking that natural law doctrine is
above all a practical, not a speculative science. Accordingly it would not seem to
comply with his idea of natural law doctrine if now, after the postwar discussion,
it fell back to a one-sided occupation with general principles.
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